University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

1969

The New Kansas Buyer Protection Act
Arthur H. Travers Jr.
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Common Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and
the State and Local Government Law Commons

Citation Information
Arthur H. Travers Jr., The New Kansas Buyer Protection Act, 38 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 11 (1969), available at
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles/1137.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation:
Arthur H. Jr. Travers, New Kansas Buyer Protection
Act, The, 38 J. Kan. B. Ass'n 11, 58 (1969)
Provided by:
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Nov 7 16:53:30 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
your smartphone or tablet device

The New Kansas Buyer
Protection Act
By ARTHUR H. TRAVERS, JR.

theory, sellers could be use a great many
The consumer is the hero of the free questionable-and uninformative-sales
market system of economic organization. techniques without fear of legal reprisals.
Indeed, perhaps the major justification The courts seem to have ignored the fact
for the market system is its unmatched that "dealers' talk" was the only informaefficiency in satisfying the consumer's tion available to guide the consumer, eswants. While it has long been recognized pecially after the revolution in packaging
that the proper functioning of the com- made inspection impossible in many inpetitive system depends upon consumers stances.
In fact the law may have made matbeing sufficiently informed and competers
worse by encouraging sellers to be
tent to choose among the goods offered
even
less informative than they otherwise
them, the problem of insuring that the
might
have been. The courts distinguished
consumer was informed and competent
between
misleading representations of
attention.'
failed to receive adequate
and misleading rep(actionable)3
fact
Textbook models of consumer behavior
of
value
(not actionresentations
simply assumed the existence of perfect
for maxisellers
looking
able).4
Naturally
knowledge-appending the caveat that
with
minimum
promotional
impact
mum
this was not true in the real world. For
risk would be encouraged thereby to
the most part we have relied on sellers
to provide the necessary information to eliminate anything in their advertisements that could be labelled "fact" and
the buyers and hoped that competition
replace it with uninformative superlaamong them would force each seller to
tives.5
make a reasonably full disclosure and
A spate of relatively recent studies has
eliminate misleading and deceptive adconfirmed what most knowledgeable obvertisements. This approach has not servors had long suspected: Although
proved totally successful.
the large, industrial buyer is ordinarily
The law did little to improve the sitable to inform himself, the average conuation. In fashioning the law of missumer is often not sufficiently informed
representation, the courts decided that
to exercise his "sovereignty"6 Even the
reasonable buyers-and only reasonable
buyers were considered worthy of legal
8 Federal Agency Investment Co. v. Holm,
protection-would recognize "puffing"
123 Kan. 82, 254 Pac. 391 (1927); Kiser v.
or "dealers' talk" for what it was and Richardson, 91 Kan. 812, 139 Pac. 373 (1914).
4 Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods, Inc., 194 Kan.
discount it accordingly. 2 Under this
INTRODUCTION

1

J. M. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC

PROCESS 466 (1961).
2 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw oF
TORTS 567-68 (1956); W. PRossER, TORTS 739

(3d ed. 1964).
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386, 399 P.2d 822 (1965); Elerick v. Reid, 54
Kan. 579, 38 Pac. 814 (1895).
5 Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive
Advertising, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1005, 1017

(1967).

6 J. M. CLARK, supra note 1, at 466.
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"the goal of implemented customer
competence [which] might be defined
as including a set of market conditions
in which customers of normal judgment are afforded the necessary means
of looking after their interest effectively enough to avoid gross and demonstrable errors .... 10
The bulk of this legislation has been directed toward improving the amount and
quality of information available to consumers. The new Buyer Protection Act,
passed by the 63rd Legislature during its
1968 session, has this objective.11 It
commits the resources of the state to a
'0 J. M.

CLARK, supra note 1, at 466.
House Bill No. 1782, Ch.341, 1968 Session
Laws 677. [Hereinafter citation to the act will
be by section without further designation.]

11

well-educated and affluent sometimes
fail to get the most for their money, but
the poor and uneducated-who desperately need to get a dollar's value for
a dollar spent-often deepen their poverty by their inability to function properly in the marketplace. 7
Although some courts have attempted
to rectify the situation within the framework of the common law by stretching
traditional concepts,8 for the most part
it has fallen to the legislatures-both
state and federal 9-to enact the measures
necessary to attain.
7 See

generally D. CAPLOVrrZ, THE PooR PAY
(1963).
leading case here is Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.
C. Cir. 1965).
9 Federal legislation includes the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 146; the Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act, 80 Stat. 1296. On
the state level the major development may
prove to be the approval by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws of a Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. For thorough analyses of the act, see Dole,
MORE
8A

The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act:
Another Step Toward a National Law of Unfair
Trade Practices,51 MINN. L. R~v. 1005 (1967);
Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The
Uniform Deceptive Trade PracticesAct, 76 YALE
L. J. 485 (1967).
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ant.12 This means that on occasion, a
defendant will be held responsible when
an employee in fact exceeded his authority. Given the nature of the remedies
granted by the act, this will ordinarily
not work a hardship on the defendant,
but it will provide an incentive for sellers
to police their salesmen and copy-writers to insure against repetitions. On
balance, it seems to be sound not to clutter up a significant number of lawsuits
THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
with issues about the actor's authority.
By defining "merchandise" to include
The substantive core of the act is found
"any objects, wares, goods, commodities,
in Section 2, which declares that
intangibles, real estate situated outside
"the act, use or employment by any the state of Kansas or services," 13 the
person of any deception, fraud, false legislature has brought under the act
pretense, false promise, misrepresenta- sellers of items that might ordinarily not
tion, or the concealment, suppression
be considered "merchandise" but which
or omission of any material fact with
intent that others rely upon such con- have on past occasions been promoted in
cealment, suppression or omission, in a questionable manner. These include
connection with the sale or advertise- desert or swampland passed off on Kanment of any merchandise, whether or sas residents with glowing descriptions
not any person has in fact been misled, of life during the sunset years in Arizona
deceived or damaged thereby, is .. . or Florida, and "services" life quickie or
an unlawful practice ... "
correspondence schools that purport to
Not only is the word "person" defined to educate their students to step into glaminclude any form of business organiza- orous jobs in various trades but in fact
tion; the definition also includes the do very little to improve their students'
opportunities.' 4
"legal representative" of any natural per- vocational abilities or
The definition of "sale" to include
son and "any agent, employee, salesman,
any
...offer for sale, or attempt to sell
partner, officer, director, member, stock...
for
cash or on credit" I'5 and "adverholder, associate, trustee or cestui que
trust" of any business organization. The tisement" to include any attempt "to inintention here seems to be to prevent duce directly or indirectly any person
evasion of the act's prohibitions by deny- to enter into any obligation or acquire
ing to a defendant the defense that his any title or interest in any merchandise"' 6
agent or employee had no authority to ought to permit the state to intervene
engage in the behavior objected to. It
12 Dispensing with proof of this issue seems
was not uncommon in the past for a conespecially wise when one considers that evidence
sumer to go without relief because he on the point is almost totally within the control
could not establish a salesman's authority of the defendant and persons dependent upon
to make the objectionable representa- the defendant for their livelihood.
13 § 1 (b).
tions. Under this definition the state
14 As is pointed out in W. MAGNUSON & J.
need only show that the actor served the CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETdefendant in one of the enumerated ca- PLACE 25 (1968) these schools usually fleece
pacities; it will not be incumbent upon the uneducated persons trying to better their lot
themselves.
state to show that the actor was operat- by15improving
§ 1 (d).
16 §1 (a).
ing within his orders from the defendprogram of eliminating misleading advertisements and promotional schemes.
While eliminating objectionable advertising does not by itself increase the
consumer, it may do this indirectly by
channeling the promotional activities of
sellers into more desirable channels. This
article seeks to introduce the provisions
of the Buyer Protection Act to those who
may be unfamiliar with them.
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against an advertisement or promotion
at any stage; clearly, they evidence an
intention to eliminate such traditional issues as the location of "title". One interesting facet of the definition of "advertisement" is the specific inclusion of any
device to disguise a solicitation as a bill
or other document conveying the impression that the consumer already has a legal obligation to pay for the goods. Thus,
the statute clearly encompasses such
techniques as sending requests to renew
magazine subscriptions dressed up as
"invoices." By the same token it ought to
empower the state to go after merchants
who will unordered merchandise to consumers and mail a "bill" a few days later.
It is too early to predict whether Section 2 will be interpreted in such a way
as to permit the state to enforce a standard of business behavior which is materially higher than that called for by the
common law of misrepresentation. Yet
there seems little doubt that the legislature intended to adopt a standard of illegality that would not be restricted in
its growth by common law concepts. To
this end, it expressly provided that certain common law issues were irrelevant
in actions under the act. For example,
the common-law plaintiff had to establish that he had relied upon the defendant's representation" and had sustained
an injury as a result therof.'5 But in an
action to enforce the new act the state
need not show that anyone '"as in fact
been misled, deceived or damaged" by
the misrepresentation-whether it be outright falsehood, studied ambiguity, halftruth, or failure to disclose. As a result it
will be unnecessary in many cases for
the state to produce any actual consumers of defendant's product, let alone
show that they had been exposed to defendant's advertising. The removal of
this evidentiary burden should signifi173 RESTATEMENT, TORTS

Is Ibid.

§ 546 (1938).

cantly increase the number of sellers
against whom the state can act.19
Moreover, proof of reliance at common
law often meant that plaintiff was required to establish a causal connection
between the misleading element of an
advertisement and his purchase. 20 Consequently, sellers could use certain questionable practices-like adopting a corporate name that suggested a large
organization, such as American, Federal,
or National2 1-that a plaintiff would be
hard pressed to show were significant
factors inducing his purchase. This obstacle will not confront the state.
Elimination of the need to show damage also will increase the number of practices that the act makes vulnerable. Suppose an advertisement claims a sewing
machine is a $400.00 value but priced at
$200.00 whereas the machine is only
worth $200.00. Since any purchaser
would know what he was getting and
the price and since any purchaser would
pay what the machine was "worth" and
no more, the damage, if any, lies in the
disappointment of the buyer's expectancy
22
that he was getting a bargain.
While there may be sound reasons
for refusing to award such an expectancy
to individual plaintiffs, they should not
hinder the state's effort to improve the
(Continued on page 51)
"9If a particular advertisement is attacked as
deceptive, it may be necessary to prove the
capacity of the advertisement to deceive. However, as noted later it is possible to prove this
by ways that do not involve the production of

deceived consumers.
20

1 F. HArm & F.

JAMES,

supra note 2, at

583-86.
21 Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived
Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 398 n. 28 (1966).
12 The courts and the Federal Trade Commission have had no difficulty finding that this is
a deceptive practice under § 5 of the Federal

Trade Commission Act. See generally G. ALEXANDER,

(1967).

HONESTY AND COMPETITION 118-24
The leading case on deceptive pric-

ing is FTC v. Standard Edue. Soc., 302 U. S.
112 (1937).
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Kansas Buyer
(Continued from page 14)

correspondence to literal truth 2 to its
impact upon the consumer. The question
has been whether the advertisement
has
28
the "capacity to deceive."
Emphasizing the impact on the consumer in turn implies the construction
a model consumer through whose eyes
the advertisement is perceived and understood. This seems especially true
under section 2 since the state need not
produce any "deceived" consumers to
29
show deception.
Under the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the FTC has been required to establish that the advertisement in question
has the capacity to deceive not the "reasonable man" of the common law-that
perceptive, attentive, skeptical paragon
-but the "average" consumer, who may
be careless or credulous. Indeed, language
in some of the cases 30 suggests that an
advertisement may be illegal if it will
mislead the "wayfaring fool"31 the sort
of chap who thinks that corn flakes sprinkled into a piano will really make piano
legs grow.
What seems to have occurred is that
the courts and the FTC balanced the seller's interest in phrasing his advertisement in a particular way against the risk
-however remote-of some consumer
being misled. 32 The weights assigned to
these interests indicate a somewhat dif-

quality of information reaching its consumers.
In addition to dispensing with reliance
and damage, Section 2 erects two separate standards of illegality that vary in
the extent to which they depart from the
common-low. "Concealment, suppression or omission" is unlawful only if "a
material fact" is concealed, suppressed or
omitted and the defendant had an "intent
that others rely upon such concealment,
suppression, or omission," but if the practice complained of involves the use of
"any deception, fraud, false pretense,
false promise, [or] misrepresentation,"
the state need not prove that a "fact" was
misrepresented, that it was "material," or
that the defendant had "scienter." 23 Since
the draftsmen of Section 2 were careful to
make these common-law concepts inapplicable to "any deception" etc., it can
hardly be that terms like "fraud" and
"misrepresentation" were intended to be
given their ,common law meanings. To
use those 24meanings-which include
"materiality" and "scienter"25-would
be to smuggle back into the act restrictions that the legislature meant to remove.
If the above analysis is sound, even
words like "fraud" in Section 2 have a
27 The FTC may, however, compel
literal
potential for growth, but the key word
truth.
Moretrench
Corp.
v.
FTC,
127
F.2d
here is likely to be "deception." A similar
792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942).
26
term-deceptive practices -in the Fed28 Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC,
eral Trade Commission Act has enabled 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944).
29 This would be so even if the state had to
the Commission and the courts to shift
produce deceived consumers since it could altheir emphasis from the advertisement's ways be questioned whether the consumers
?

It is enough if the defendant intended to

induce the plaintiff to act upon a false statement; scienter does not require any intent to

injure. 1 F.
at 532-33.

HARPER

& F.

JAMES,

supra note 2,

24 "Materiality" means that a reasonable buyer
would consider the undisclosed fact important. See 3 RESTATEMENT , TORTS § 538 (1938).
25 See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 525 (1938).
26 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
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produced were representative of the advertisement's audience; hence, some sort of comparison
of the witnesses' characteristics with a model

would
seem required.
30

E.g., Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.
2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961).
31 The language is from General Motors Corp.
v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), in
which the court quoted from the prophet Isa-

iah.
32See

Note, supra note 5, at 1042.

ferent scheme of values than that which
prevailed at common law: Any appreciable risk of deception is treated as excessive, especially if it appears that the seller
has alternative ways of phrasing his
33
message that do not create such as risk.
Vanished almost entirely is the idea that
some risk of deception is tolerable because the consumer is obligated to protect
himself. The elimination of this duty of
self-protection has dictated the choice of
the "wayfaring fool" rather than the
"reasonable man" to serve as a model.
The draftsmen of the new Kansas act
evidently intended to depart from the
common law by making illegal at least
some devices that would not deceive the
"reasonable" man, but it is too early to
gauge the extent to which the courts will
sanction a departure from the common
law.
Another interesting question posed by
the act is the extent to which Section 2
may impose upon sellers and advertisers
an affirmative duty to disclose information about their products that they
would prefer to keep hidden. Section 2
does declare that "any concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact
with intent that others rely upon such
concealment, suppression or omission," is
unlawful, but this language may do little
more than enact the common law.
Although the Kansas court has often
reiterated the accepted rule that parties
to an arm's length transaction, such as a
merchant and consumer, have no obligation to disclose information to each
other, 34 several cases have held "conceal33 For example, in Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d
580 (2d Cir. 1944), the court agreed with the
FTC that defendant's description of its hair coloring as permanent might induce some purchasers to think it would dye hair that had not grown
out. It seems highly unlikely that an appreciable number of persons would put that interpretation on the advertisement, but eliminating
the objectionable word would not materially
restrict the defendant's ability to convey his
message.
34E.g., Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co. v.
Grear, 76 Kan. 164, 90 Pac. 770 (1907).

ment"-as distinct from "nondisclosure"
-to be actionable fraud. Jenkins v. McCormick35 found fraudulent concealment
where a contractor covered a defective
concrete floor with title to hide its condition from prospective home buyers,
knowing that the condition of the concrete would later cause the tile to crack
36
and come loose. Larrick v. Jacobson
invalidated a mortgage secured from a
husband and wife upon their homestead.
The wife had previously told the mortgagee that she would never sign a mortgage on that property, but he remained
silent while the wife signed the mortgage,
knowing full well that she thought the
mortgage covered a different tract and
would not have signed had she known
the truth.
The point to note about these cases is
that neither raises serious questions
about materiality and scienter. The contractor's behavior alone warrants the inference that he knew the floor's condition
would be a significant factor in any reasonable buyer's purchase decision 37 and
38
that he intended to affect that decision.
Likewise there is no doubt of the mortgagee's knowledge of the importance of
the undisclosed information and his
specific intent that the wife should sign
a result of her mistaken impression.
The new act also requires that the state
establish the materiality of any concealed, suppressed or omitted facts
and defendant's scienter. If proof of
these elements means establishing either
that the defendant deliberately concealed information otherwise available
to the consumer (Jenkins) or that the
consumer specifically informed the defendant that a particular factor was
crucial to his purchase decision and the
defendant'knew the consumer was mis35 184 Kan. 842, 339 P.2d 8 (1959).
3 139 Kan. 522, 32 P.2d 204 (1934).

" Were this not the case, he would hardly

have gone to the trouble of concealing the floor.
38It is not necessary that he intended to
change that behavior.
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taken (Larrick), the statute will impose
no greater duty to disclose than did the
common law. The imposition of a greater
duty can result only if the courts are willing to hold a seller who fails to disclose
otherwise unavailable information about
his merchandise on the ground that any
reasonable person in the seller's position
would know that a buyer would consider
the information significant, and hence
the intent to affect the buyer's behavior
can be inferred from the nondisclosure.
The trouble with this theory is that it
affords no basis for limiting the seller's
duty to disclose. Almost anything viewed
in retrospect may seen significant information. Obviously, it is not possible
for an advertisement to contain everything that a buyer might like to know
about the product. And it would probably be undesirable even if it were possible, since consumers would be inundated with such a mass of data that they
could not be expected to assimilate it.
Ideally, the duty to disclose should be
imposed very gradually with the objective of requiring every advertisement
eventually to meet some minimum level
of informativeness.
Something of this sort may be occurring under the Federal Trade Commission
Act. In 1950 the FTC's attempt to require
the maker of an iron tonic to disclose in
its advertisements that most tired people
were not suffering from iron deficiency
anemia and hence would not be helped
by the tonic was overturned by the federal court.3 9 Recently, however, the Sixth
Circuit approved an FTC order requiring the maker of Geritol to disclose the
the identical information. 4° The difference in result seems attributable to the
difference in the theories espoused by
the FTC.41 In the earlier case, the FTC
argued that every advertisement contains
39

Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.)

denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950).
cert.
40

J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884
(6th Cir. 1967).
41 See Note, supra note 5, at 1048.
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an implied representation that all material facts had been disclosed, a theory offering no way of distinguishing between
what must be disclosed and what may be
kept hidden. In the later case, the FTC
offered no sweeping principle and the
court's opinion articulates none. All that
can be said is that the FTC and the
courts are somewhat gingerly forcing affirmative disclosures by advertisers in
some cases. It is hoped that the Kansas
act will be similarly pushed beyond the
common law to require affirmative disclosures in some cases on a case-by-case
basis that allows some limiting principle
to emerge.
Section 2 is limited by two provisos.
First, the owner of the medium of communication that disseminates the advertisement is not hold responsible if he
"has no knowledge of the intent, design
or purpose of the advertiser." With some
such exemption for media owners it is
hard to quarrel, but two features of the
present exemption seem open to question. First, the owner must have "knowledge" of the advertiser's intent, design
or purpose instead of "notice." This suggests that an owner having no actual
subjective knowledge would be exculpated even though a reasonable person in
the owner's position should have realized
what was going on. 42 In effect this subjective test eliminates any pressure on the
owner to conduct any investigation
before accepting advertising copy. Indeed, it may discourage such an investigation since information of which the
owner has actual knowledge makes him
subject to the act. Accordingly, there is
an advantage to knowing as little as possible. Had the act been drafted in such
a way as to induce media owners to investigate advertisers and reject questionable advertisements, it would have provided a material aid to the state in
42
This is the conventional distinction between
"notice" and "knowledge." See, e.g., the discussion in W. SrAvEY, Ac ncY 17-18 (1964).

achieving its objective of improving the serted jurisdiction over intrastate acts
related to interstate activity. 47 Under
information reading consumers.
Furthermore, it is the advertiser's in- either approach, however, a substantial
tent, design or purpose of which the number of activities occur wholly within
owner must have knowledge. This per- Kansas and are not exempted from the
mits a medium owner to accept with act.
Even if the FTC would have jurisdicimpunity advertising which he knows to
be untrue, deceptive, or otherwise illegal tion over the activity, there is no excepso long as he knows nothing about the tion from a state suit unless the advertisestate of mind of the advertiser. There ment complies with FTC standards.
seems to be no reason why an owner Undoubtedly this exemption would proshould escape responsibility for dis- tect a seller who could show that the very
seminating advertising that he knows to advertisement challenged by the state
be illegal. Here too the draftsmen seem had been approved by the FTC, but few
to have passed up an opportunity to sellers will be in that position. It might
maximize the impact of the new act in- be argued that the exemption should be
ducing to media owners to refuse unlaw- restricted to those cases in which the
particular advertisement in issue has
ful advertising.
By a second proviso the act is made in- been sanctioned by the FTC. This narapplicable to "any advertisement which row interpretation presupposes that the
is subject to and complies with the rules exemption is designed solely to avoid
and regulations of, and the statutes ad- conflict between federal and state enministered by the federal trade commis- forcement agencies in particular cases.
sion." Thus, the advertisement must first
A broader and, to my mind, preferbe one over which the FTC has jurisdic- able interpretation would permit any
tion, which, as a practical matter, means merchant to show that if the FTC's rules
43
that interstate commerce in involved.
and standards were applied to his adverIf false advertising of food, drugs, de- tisement, it would be held lawful. This
vices, or cosmetics is under attack, the construction assumes that the proviso has
FTC has jurisdiction if the advertiser the broader purpose of not subjecting
has engaged in interstate advertising merchants subject to both state and fedwhether he has made any interstate sales eral jurisdiction to conflicting standards
of behavior. In effect the state would be
or not.,4 If other goods we're involved,
45
working with the federal government by
the 1941 case of FTC v. Bunte Brothers,
in which the Supreme Court held that enforcing federally created standards
the FTC could not reach purely intra- against activities in interstate commerce
48
state transactions that affect interstate that the FTC has not gone after. It is
commerce, presumably controls. The well known that the FTC lacks the reFTC has never directly challenged the sources to attack more than a small poradvertising under
case 46 although it has successfully as- tion of the deceptive
its jurisdiction. 49 State enforcement of
" Another jurisdictional limitation-that the federal standards can free the FTC to
proceeding appear to the reviewing court to be devote most of its time to bringing those
in the "public interest"-has fallen into utter
disuse. Compare FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19
(1929), with Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295
F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961).
4Mueller v. United States, 262 F.2d 443
(5th Cir. 1958).
44r6 312 U.S. 349 (1941).

less rigorous standards than are presently being
enforced by the FTC; in that event, the proviso
would act as a kind of ceiling.

3 (1967).

14, at 78-80.

G. ALEX

Dr'ER, HoNEsry AND COMPETrTON

47 E.g., Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d
403 (3d Cir. 1961).

41 Of course, the state might choose to enforce

49 See W. MAGNIUSON & J. CARPER, supra note
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cases that offer opportunities for doctrinal development while the state makes
sure the law is obeyed.50 Of course, with
respect to intrastate activities the state is
free to develop its own standards.
With respect to the "chain referral
sales" technique, the draftsmen departed
from the approach of making a promotion or advertisement unlawful only if it
was fraudulent or deceptive and adopted
a flat prohibition against the use of any
referral sales scheme to induce a "buyer"
to purchase merchandise for a price in
excess of $50.00. 51 Under the typical referral sales scheme, a merchant tells a
prospective purchaser that for every person referred to the merchant by the purchaser who buys the same or similar
merchandise the merchant will give the
purchaser a stated "commission."5 2 Often
this technique is combined with other
questionable practices and almost always
it is used to distract the consumer's attention from the details of the transaction
he is about to enter, thus making other
53
deceptive practices more effective.
Evidently, the legislature decided that
the referral sales technique is so likely to
be used to mulct consumers and so rarely
used in good faith that it was not worth
the administrative inconvenience to attempt a case-by-case examination of the
practice. The only qualifications .to the
rule are that the purchaser must be purchasing the merchandise for household
'

This would, of course, require the. state

courts to apply standards which they have no
hand in creating. This is not a particularly difficult assignment, and it is essentially what is
called for under choice-of-law rules and the
doctrine of Erie RR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).

r'§ 3.

52 Were such a scheme used deceptively, it
would undoubtedly be covered by § 2. The
element of chance is so strong in a referral sales
scheme, however, that some states have held
them illegal under state lottery laws. E.g., Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 409 P.
2d 160 (Wash. 1965).
53

See Note, supra note 21, at 398-99.
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consumption5 4 and that the price of the
purchase-not the "value"-must exceed
$50.00
ENFORCEMENT
The act empowers either the Attorney
General or a county attorney to take the
initiative in eliminating unlawful practices. 55 In either case, the act provides
for cooperation between the Attorney
General's office and the local county attorneys. Should the Attorney General
initiate the action, he may request such
assistance as he needs from the county
attorney in the locality in which the
action is brought. 6 On the other hand, if
a county attorney brings the action, he is
required "to make a full report thereon to
the attorney general including the final
disposition of the matter." On its most
literal reading this provision would require no communication from the county
attorney to the Attorney General until the case was concluded; it does not
prescribe who shall determine the contents of those reports. Yet the structure of
the act leaves no doubt that is the Attorney General who hears the primary enforcement responsibilities under the act.
Furthermore, sound administration would
dictate that the state evolve a single enforcement policy and that each enforcement agency operate within the framework so established. Finally, the Attorney
General's office will develop specialists in
buyer protection. However able a county
attorney may be, he is unlikely to have
this sort of expertise.5 7 All of these factors
54This result comes about through the definition of a "buyer" in § 1 (e) as one who purchases "not for resale in the ordinary course of
his trade or business but for his use or that of
a member of his household or in connection
with the operation of his household."

5 § § 4, 8, 14.
16
51

§ 14.

It would seem that under ordinary doctrines
of res judicata the attorney general would be
barred from attacking any practice that had
been the subject of an unsuccessful suit by the
county attorney; hence, it is important that the
first suit be properly tried.

suggest that the purpose of the act would
best be served if the local attorneys were
required to submit progress reports to
the Attorney General's office at each
stage of any litigation they commence, in
such form and with such content as the
Attorney General's office may prescribe.
It should also be understood that the Attorney General is free to oversee and
direct any action at anytime.
The extent to which a county attorney
will play a role in any given action will
in most cases depend upon the location
of the trial, which in turn is determined
by the venue provisions of Section 13.
These give the state a choice of courts in
which to bring an action. Any defendant-resident or nonresident-may be
sued in the district court of any county
in which an unlawful practice occurred.
Thus, if an advertiser disseminated unlawful advertising in every county in
Kansas, he could be sued in every county.
If the defendant is a resident of Kansas,
action may also be brought where the
defendant resides. Whether resident or
nonresident, if the defendant has his
principal place of business in Kansas, he
may be sued where that principal place
of business is located. If the defendant
has neither a residence nor a principal
place of business in Kansas, he may be
used in the district court of Shawnee
county, a location offering maximum convenience to the Attorney General. It may
be expected that the Attorney General
will attempt to lay venue in the most
convenient court possible and, in such
cases, there will be little or nothing for
the county attorney to do. Only if the
venue provision compels an action to be
brought in an inconvenient location will
the Attorney General rely heavily upon
the county attorney.
The basic remedy afforded the state
under the act is the injunction. When an
enforcement agency has "reasonable cause
to believe that any person has engaged
in, is engaging, or is about to engage in"
an unlawful practice it may file for an

injunction.5 8 The court is not limited to
the granting of preventive relief; it may
also order the restoration by any appropriate means of money acquired by the
defendant as a result of a violation of
the act. 9 Presumably, in the ordinary
case, it would suffice if the defendant
paid a sum of money into court for distribution, by means of a master or otherwise, to the defendant's customers. But
if the defendant's violation is "substantial and willful" the court may revoke
any certificate or license permitting the
defendant to do business in Kansas or
appoint a receiver 6° who is given the
power to collect every asset of the defendant derived through a practice made illegal under the act, together with every
other asset with which they may have
been commingled. 61 Thus if it is not possible to segregate those of .the defendant's assets acquired as a result of an
unlawful practice the receiver may be
empowered to take over the defendant's
entire business. The assets which thus
pass into the receiver's hands are to be
held for the benefit of those who have
suffered damage as a result of the defendant's illegal practices the receiver is
empowered either to distribute the assets
collected in kind or to sell the assets and
distribute the proceeds. Claimants under
the act are treated in the same manner as
the defendant's general creditors and are
entitled to receive all out-of-pocket
losses they are able to prove.6 2- It is to be
noted that no expectancy interest is
awarded claimants under this act. Thus,
if the defendant tells the plaintiff that
58§

8.

59Ibid.
60

Ibid.

61§ 9.

02 § 12 provides that the provision of the act
"shall not bar any claim against any person
who has acquired any moneys or property, real
or personal, by means of any practice herein
declared to be unlawful," except where there
has been a court order terminating the defendant's business affairs "after receivership proceedings."
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defendant's aluminum siding is a "$400.00
value" that the plaintiff can have for
$250.00 whereas the siding is in fact
worth $175.00, plaintiffs damages are
$75.00, not $225.00. One may expect that
a receiver will not often be appointed.
Not only is the relief unusually severe,
but it requires more state resources to be
devoted to a single case than can be
spared except in extraordinary circumstances.
If the act is to be administered with
maximum efficiency the overwhelming
majority of cases will have to be disposed
of through an informal settlement procedure leading to an "assurance of discontinuance." Only in this way will the
state be able to proceed against a sufficient number of defendants. 63 Assurances
are required to be in writing and filed
with a district court having proper venue
under the act. The chief advantage to
the state in securing such an assurance
lies in the fact that a violation of the assurance within six years of its filing is
deemed "prima facie proof of a violation" of the act. Thus, if the state sought
injunctive or other judicial relief initially, it would have the burden of establishing that the defendant's conduct was
proscribed by the act. If, however, the
state accepted an assurance of discontinuance and later sued to enjoin a violation
of the assurance, the state need show
only that the assurance had been violated.
The defendant would then have the burits conden of persuading the court 6that
4
duct did not violate the act.
The act offers two inducements to defendants to sign an assurance. First,
violation of an injunction will subject a
M § 10.
G4 Actually, the use of the phrase "prima facie"
suggests only that the court would be warranted
in finding a violation of the law, not that it
would be compelled to. Nevertheless, since
the burden shifted to the defendant is one of
establishing a point of law' instead of establishing a set of facts, it would seem that the
view expressed in the text is the more logical
one.
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defendant to liability for a civil penalty
of $10,00065 whereas violation of an assurance will lead only to a suit for an injunction under the circumstances outlined
above. 66 Second, the act provides that an
assurance "shall not be considered an ad67
mission of a violation for any purpose."
Although the act is not crystal clear on
this point, this provision seems to relate
to the use that a subsequent private litigant may make of the assurance. If the
state were forced to seek judicial relief
against a defendant, statements made
during that proceeding and, perhaps,
even the final judgment of that proceeding could be used by a subsequent private
plaintiff under the admissions exception
to the hearsay rule.68 A defendant who
considers defeat likely or who believes
he will be required to admit facts that
might later be used against him will have
some incentive to execute an assurance.6 9
The initiation of a judicial proceeding
(leading either to judgment or an assurance) or the acceptance of an assurance
without litigation will ordinarily be preceded by some sort of state investigation. The act grants the state agencies extensive investigatory powers, but it is not
mandatory that every action be preceded
by an investigation so complete as to
call into use any or all of the powers so
granted. An informal investigation would
65§ 11.
66 This assumes that an assurance, although
filed in court, is not a "court order" within the
meaning of § 11.

67 § 10.

68 See generally, 4 J. WIGMORE,
1048059 (3rd ed. 1940).

EVIDENCE

§

A parallel arrangement exists under the
federal antitrust laws. Under § 5 (a) of the
Clayton Act, final judgments rendered against
a defendant in a government action may be
used as prima facie evidence of a violation in
a subsequent private action against that defendant, with the exception that consent judgments rendered before any evidence was taken
69

shall not be so used. See generally Timberlake,
The Use of Government Judgments of Decrees

in Subsequent Treble Damage Actions Under
the Antitrust Laws, 36 N. Y. U. L. REV. 991
(1961).

be sufficient if it gave the state agency
reasonable cause to believe that a violation had occurred, was occurring or was
about to occur.
Still, as a matter of tactics, a full scale
investigation would often be the best
route for an agency contemplating an
action. All that is required is that the
state agency receive a verified complaint
setting forth facts showing a past or present (but not threatened) violation and
that it determine that an investigation
would be in the public interest.70 Then
the agency may require the alleged violator to file a statement under oath setting
forth whatever information the agency
requires;71 any person-not merely an
72
alleged violator-may be examined;
books records, documents and other ma73
terial evidence may be examined or,
74
pursuant to a court order, impounded.
The act provides that any subpoena or
notice issued in connection with the conduct of such an investigation as well as
any action filed to enforce the act may be
served outside the state of Kansas in any
one of a variety of ways. 75 By its terms
the act does not require that the person
so served have any contact with the state
of Kansas. Under recent Supreme Court
70

§ 4.
4 (1).
4 (2).

71§
72§

§ 4 (3).
74§ 4 (4).
73

7 § 6 provides that if personal service within
the state cannot be obtained, then substituted
service may be made in any of the following
ways: "(a) Personal service . . . without this
state; or (b) the mailing . . . by certified mail
to the last known place of business, residence
or abode within or without this state of such
person for whom the same is intended; or (c)
in the manner provided in the code of civil
procedure ...;or (d) such service as the district court may direct in lieu of personal service within this state."

rulings a state is entitled to compel nonresident corporations-and possibly nonresident individuals and unincorporated
associations-to appear in its courts if the
party served has sufficient contacts with
the state to make his appearing there not
unfair. 76 It is to be doubted whether a
state agency would take an interest in
any alleged violator who did not have
such contacts. Thus, the systematic advertising in Kansas or even the sporadic
selling to Kansas residents ought to be
enough to support jurisdiction, 77 although
the point has not been definitively settled. More troublesome is the provision
granting the state agency the power to
subpoena an out-of-state nonresident witness in the course of an investigation. Invocation of that power will probably be
met by constitutional challenge and the
outcome is very much in doubt.
Finally, the provision for a $10,000
civil penalty for the violation of any injunction or court order issued pursuant
to the act is also the ultimate sanction
against those who refuse to cooperate
with .the state agency conducting an investigation, but a two-step process is required. First, the agency must get a court
order designed to secure such cooperation.7 8 Further recalcitrance subjects the
79
person to liability for the penalty.
76 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
77Cf. the discussion in Tilley v. Keller Truck
& Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d
128 (1968), upholding the constitutionality of
the Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. § 60-308.
78§ 7.
79 The exact nature of the proceeding to impose this penalty is unclear. Although the
penalty is labelled a "civil" penalty, the act is
headed "Crimes and Punishment." Moreover,
the penalty seems designed to vindicate the
power of the court as well as to secure compliance with the court's order.
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